In 2003, Nigeria formally completed its transition to a warlord state governed as a collection of fiefdoms with
differing judicial systems. The collapse of law and order has accelerated the previously hypothesized weakening
of Nigeria�s 4th Republic, and will hasten the disintegration of the Nigerian state. With a complete
loss of confidence in all branches of the Federal government, intensification of the war in the Niger Delta, the
open ethnicization of military dissent, and the rise of a shadowy 3rd Force, among other factors, it remains but
a question of time before the Nigerian republic experiences a catastrophic meltdown. For previously unprepared
parties, the moment for defining working relationships with Nigeria�s successor states has finally arrived.
B.
Analysis
Early Warning
Signs:
Early in the life of the Obasanjo regime, the Federal Minister of Justice and close confidant of President Olusegun
Obasanjo was executed in his living room by assassins. His police security details had mysteriously disappeared
to obtain dinner at a
neighborhood restaurant about 30 minutes before the assassination. Notwithstanding dramatic gestures from
the presidential palace, the centralized Federal police bureaucracy and other agencies of the Nigerian state, the
murderer(s) of the former minister are yet to be brought to justice. While a suspect, former Osun State Deputy-Governor,
Mr. Omisore (now a serving Senator of the Federal Republic, having won an election from prison while being held
on murder charges) is in custody, his trial has turned into a predictable farce.
The inability of the Nigerian state to collect forensic evidence, advance a plausible hypothesis of the crime,
conduct investigations to prove or disprove the theory of the crime, and successfully coordinate across its own
agencies to prosecute the assassins is a startling line in the sand. The crime, compounded by intimidation
of witnesses, serving and potential judges, and mysterious disappearance of case files between �federating� states
of Nigeria, among other examples, can after two-years of patient observation be viewed as a watershed moment in
highlighting the triumph of mediocrity that masquerades as a functioning Nigerian state.
C.
Recent Markers of Collapse
I.
The Ngige Case
The case of Dr. Ngige, the current Governor of Anambra State, is a fascinating
one as it represents a confluence of the issues this report is concerned with. The Ngige saga illustrates
the range of crimes committed by a number of personalities whose common affiliation is membership in the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP).
� Conspiracy to Subvert Public Will: Prior to
the conduct of the Anambra
State governorship
election � a process still being challenged by the opposition, Dr. Ngige conspired with key members of the Anambra State and National offices of the PDP. In particular, Mr. Chris Uba, a self-described �godfather�
entered into an agreement with Dr. Ngige that in return for arranging his electoral victory, he, Dr. Ngige would
make certain monetary payments to Uba valued at a minimum of N3 billion ($22 million). From subsequent disclosures made by both parties and interested
third parties, it appears that the N3
billion was to be the minimum amount to be paid to Mr. Chris Uba. In addition, among other fail-safe measures to
protect what he kindly termed �his investment,� Mr. Uba required and got Dr. Ngige to sign a pre-emptive resignation
statement.
� Conspiracy to Overthrow a State Government:
On July 10, 2003,
an operation was mounted by a police detachment detailed from Abuja, the Federal Capital. Led by Mr. Raphael Ige (now deceased, following an �early retirement
after he failed in his mission), the coup plotters temporarily overthrew Dr. Ngige�s government and attempted to
swear in his Deputy as the new Governor. A number of propitious factors helped Dr. Ngige survive that attempt.
Since the failure of the first mission, as of April 2004, additional missions (at least 3) have been mounted to
overthrow Dr. Ngige, each mission operated using similar modus operandi � i.e., leveraging a compliant Federal police infrastructure.
As of the
publication date of this report, Dr. Ngige is yet to have restored to him an official security detail notwithstanding
the ruling of Nigerian courts ordering such an action. The security detail was withdrawn ahead of the first
assault.
II.
The One Party State
Historically, Mr. Obasanjo has not masked his desire that Nigeria should be a one-party state. Obasanjo signaled a desire
to operate a one-party state in Nigeria. In a number of his writings pre-1999; he spoke in glowing terms of such an approach. Not
surprisingly, his administration fought efforts to authorize additional political parties. Since the Supreme
Court forced such a step, what began as dark whispers finally emerged into daylight when Mr. Donald Duke, Governor
of Cross Rivers State called for such a contraption. According to Mr. Duke, as cited in the Daily Independent,
a leading Nigerian newspaper, opposition merely represents a distraction. According to Governor Duke, opposition
parties should fold into the PDP and work for �grassroots� development. While Mr. Duke may be dismissed as just another opinionated
governor, given his closeness to Mr. Obasanjo, it is hard not to conclude that his commentary was more or less
cleared for primetime. In recent months, Mr. Duke�s ranking within the PDP has risen as he is being considered
as a Vice-President or potentially President in 2007. Thus, one must view with clear prejudice such an open
endorsement however non-political it may appear.
III.
Emerging Constitutional Histrionics
An idea is being floated around Abuja that Mr. Obasanjo via the instrumentality
of a constitutional amendment is exploring or being urged by parties, including but not limited to Mr. Anenih
and Bode George, to seek a third term in office. In addition, certain state governors and more pliable local
officials will be returned to office once the idea of a single 5-7 year of office is introduced. While the
committee from the National Assembly charged with developing the amendments has denied such �rumors� - as has Mr.
Obasanjo - a sufficient amount of precedent leaves a number of observers skeptical. For example, Mr. Anenih�s
infamous assertion that �no vacancy exists in Aso Rock� has yet to be withdrawn. Based on Mr. Anenih�s recent
re-statement of that operating principle in Adamawa State�s
gubernatorial case, it is hard to imagine that he will not make such an assertion should Mr. Obasanjo lose the
presidential election petition brought by Mr. Buhari, the candidate for the alleged opposition party, the All Nigeria
Peoples Party (ANPP).
A second level to the emerging constitutional crisis is the refusal of
the Federal Government to recognize local government areas (LGAs) created by Lagos, Nasarawa, Ebonyi, Niger and Katsina states. Mr. Obasanjo took the interesting and illegal step of asking the National
Council of States, a purely advisory body under the 1999 Constitution, to pronounce the creation of additional LGAs illegal even
though it had no power to take such a stance. Following the refusal of the states ( to bow to his will �
evidenced by their decision to conduct elections in such areas in late March 2004 � the Obasanjo regime according
to Mr. Tinubu, Governor of Lagos (circa April 15, 2004), has threatened to cut off local government related funding
to the state entirely. As of April 20,
2004, according to junior Minister of Finance, Mrs. Esther Nenadi Usman,
the cutoff had been ordered via a letter to the Federal Account Allocation Committee from Mr. Obasanjo (Ref No.
F12090/1v/p2/322) . Given the absurd degree to which all the 36 states rely on the Federal Government for
their economic life, such a threat naturally cannot be taken lightly. It appears the Obasanjo regime is prepared
to strangle Nigerian citizens in order to score political points. Coupled with the recent house arrest imposed
on Mr. Tinubu and a number of ex-governors during a late March 2004 visit to Ekiti State, controlled by the PDP,
such an assault can only be seen as pressure designed to signal the futility of opposing Mr. Obasanjo�s faction,
and grand strategy.
IV.
The Obasanjo-Anenih-George-Duke/Southern Grand Strategy
Mr. Obasanjo was elected in 1999 as a client of Nigeria�s northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani
military elite clustered around former dictator, General Ibrahim Babangida. When Obasanjo was released from
prison by the clique�s representative and then Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Mr. Obasanjo was to
put it politely, down and out on his luck. As a result, it did not prove too difficult for General Babangida,
General Abubakar and other international interests (US Government, Corporate Council on Africa, Royal Dutch Shell,
British Government) to persuade Mr. Obasanjo to stand for (s)election. Naturally, he won the election on
the promise to reform Nigeria.
Five years later, faced with numerous reminders from his sponsors that he owed his life, livelihood and power to
the northern military establishment, Mr. Obasanjo apparently has decided to build his own clique. In secret
deliberations with Mr. Anenih his operational adviser, Mr. Obasanjo has employed a two pronged strategy:
(i) Utilize northern members of his regime such as Mr. El-Rufai (Minister Federal Capital
Territory) and
Vice-President Atiku Abubakar to execute a strategy of divide and rule among the northern elite (military and civilian
factions). His strategy has worked reasonably well, and forced the North�s official face, the Arewa Consultative
Forum (ACF), to jump from foot to foot, trying to stay ahead of the curve. The ACF�s latest efforts is to
attempt to paint Mr. Obasanjo as a dangerous zealot who cannot be trusted to keep to the terms of a deal; the upshot
of such an assessment is that the North must cease working for him, and pool its resources in order to return power
to the North in 2007, presuming something approaching elections are actually held, barring which power would be
sought via the traditional strategy of sponsoring middle ranked officers to launch a coup.
(ii) Persuade southern politicians that he, Mr. Obasanjo, represents the southern
Nigerian states best chance to grab power, and the economic, political and military advantages that come with it.
The first public display of such an approach was the agreement entered into with the Alliance for Democracy (AD) in the weeks before
the April 2003 elections. While the AD kept the bargain, Mr. Obasanjo did not. His intention was really
to ensure that the AD self-immolated by proving to the public how cheap it really was. As a result, generous
publicity was provided to the fact that the AD had requested ministerial and ambassadorial postings in return for
not fielding a presidential candidate against Mr. Obasanjo. The other dimension of the approach is to identify,
groom and arrange for election of key lieutenants such as Mr. Fayose (Governor � Ekiti) and Mr. Daniels (Governor
� Ogun). His vision is to develop sufficient enough of a power and patronage base in southern Nigeria, with select clients in northern
Nigeria that he would effectively checkmate the old northern elite, military and/or civilian. In
some respects, his approach is different from previous Nigerian dictators in that while he is also building a cult
of the personality, he is focused on promoting pliant and loyal men and women from across Nigeria. In that respect, he
is closest to Mr. Babangida in his logic.
Naturally, the question that emerges is: how will the old northern establishment
respond to Mr. Obasanjo�s power grab? As suggested earlier, the northern establishment will make a power
grab either as a unified front in 2007, or in a military coup prior to 2007.
V.
Financing the Grand Strategy, Undermining the Economy
Overturning the balance of power in Nigeria after almost 40 years of domination
by the Hausa-Fulani military elite and their civilian allies is a tough task. It must also be financed.
Rather than strip state coffers directly as ex-dictator and murderer, General Sani Abacha did, Mr. Obasanjo and
his PDP faction have taken the interesting but ultimately traditional step of controlling access to economic activity
as well as shrewdly confiscating state revenues.
For example, the vast sums devoted to the National ID Card system appear
to have been paid out but with little in the way of IDs to show for it. During the recent Commonwealth Heads
of Government conference, a number of prominent Nigerians including one serving and one former minister were arrested
on charges that they corrupted the ID card process. However that approach backfired. In attempting
to defend his reputation against charges of personal corruption (e.g. accepting a bribe of $345,000), former minister,
Mr. Sunday Afolabi argued that the bribe was accepted and used to fund the PDP�s electoral �victory� in the southwestern
states of Nigeria.
Set aside the core issue: a willful conspiracy to undermine a supposed priority national project in order to win a dubious
election, what the ID Card bribery scam demonstrates is clear evidence that the Nigerian government headed by Mr.
Obasanjo is irredeemably corrupt. Assume Mr. Obasanjo is not personally corrupt (a similar line is put forward
by defenders of Mr. Shagari, civilian president in 1979-83), one must question (i) his judgment in appointing and retaining Mr. Afolabi
et al
in his cabinet, and (ii) the competence of the State Security Services (SSS), the agency that is responsible for providing
background checks on ministers.
Based on previous estimates developed by the Biafran Central Intelligence Agency (BCIA), Mr. Afolabi�s behavior
is not unusual. In fact it is part and parcel of the execution of the grand strategy. Other sources of funding
for 2003 elections included the now infamous N300
billion collected by Mr. Anenih, as well as bribes collected at the Nigerian Ports Authority under Mr. Bode George,
the PDP�s Vice-Chairman in the Southwest. Mr. George is famous for promising to ensure the PDP�s total victory
in the Southwest. The Abuja rumor mill is also rife with claims that Mr. Obasanjo through close associates maintains a firm
control over oil lifting contracts.
Thus, what is different about the Obasanjo approach relative to other power hungry ex-dictators in Nigeria is the degree to which he and/or
his faction would go towards reshaping the Nigerian economy and institutions to fit their purpose. For example,
to ensure control over inflows at the port, a number of complementary policies have been put in place, including
restricting certain classes of goods such as textiles to Lagos Port.
In effect, by banning importation through Port Harcourt in Eastern Nigeria
for example, the PDP mechanism seeks to maximize what revenues it can extract for financing its grand strategy.
Also, the regime has banned dozens of products under the pretext that Nigerian manufacturers can produce them.
In an environment without stable electricity, water, or law and order, those who do produce will do so at inflated
cost structures, and will come to depend on the regime to keep Nigeria closed to competition. The outcome would be to build a fiercely loyal cadre of supporters,
many of whom are members of the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN).
VI.
The Slow Motion Collapse of Law & Order and the Rise of the 3rd Force
Nigeria�s 250,000 strong police force (1 officer for 480 citizens) appears undermanned, outgunned,
and hostage to multiple political forces; ditto for Nigeria�s judiciary. As a result, Nigeria has witnessed a growing spate of politically motivated assassinations. Victims have included
the Vice-Chairmen of the PDP, state electoral commissioners, former senior civil servants, members of the bar association,
etc. The list grows each day. When cases are brought before the judiciary � in the rare instance �
numerous roadblocks emerge to block their adjudication. At least a handful of state governors have survived
assassination attempts in 2003 and 2004. In a majority of the cases such as the assassination of the PDP�s
Vice-Chairman, Mr. Dikibo, in Delta State
and the attempted assassination of the Benue State Governor, Mr. Akume, senior PDP officials, including Mr. Obasanjo
described the attacks as the work
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of �armed robbers.� The statements where made without the benefit of any investigation, preliminary or conclusive.
While a number of observers have speculated that the killings are ordered from within the PDP , Mr. Orji Kalu,
the Abia State Governor, has come the closest to confirming this claim. Mr. Kalu recently claimed that Mr. Anenih
intends to have him murdered as the penalty for Kalu�s disloyalty to PDP, as well as for making false allegations
that he, Mr. Anenih, embezzled over N300
billion allocated for road construction while Anenih was the Minister for Works & Housing in 1999-2003.
A subsequent disclosure by the auditor of the said ministry suggests that the actual amount allocated to the Ministry
was closer to N240 billion, but was silent as to its disbursement or judicious use.
An alternate hypothesis is that a so-called 3rd Force is responsible
for the spate of murders. The idea is premised on the notion that the attacks have taken place often with
military precision, involved sophisticated weaponry and large groups of well coordinated attackers. The idea
may not be far-fetched as the late General Sani Abaca�s regime (1993-98) utilized a similar device under the command
of Major Hamza Al-Mustapha, former head of presidential security.
In April 2004, the Obasanjo regime claimed it had uncovered a coup plot
involving at least a few dozen military officers and civilians, including Major Al-Mustapha. The plot allegedly
included a provision for conducting similar disruptive killings designed to sow terror and create a sense of state
incompetence. Could
the assassinations from 1999 to present be part of the same plot or could it be that multiple parties are employing
similar strategies but for very different reasons? The latter argument is probably more plausible as the
idea of assassinating or murdering political opponents outside of the mechanism of a coup d� état is an
idea well ingrained in the Nigerian power elite�s mentality ever since the murder of Mr. Dele Giwa, a journalist
who inquired once too often about drug smuggling allegations around then dictator, Gen. Babangida. Whatever
the truth is, and whether one or more such 3rd Forces exist, the effort is clearly registering as many public officials
are now placing orders for bullet proof vests, cars, and similar protective services. Bottomline: both public and private actors have lost faith
in the ability of the Nigerian state to protect them.
VII.
The Ijaw-Nigeria War
A state of war exists
in the Niger Delta. What began as a number of limited military
engagements (under Rivers States Internal Security Task Force led by the brutal yet highly decorated Lt. Colonel
Paul Okuntimo) following the Ogoni uprising in the early 1990s, has transmuted into a vast operation called Operation
Restore Hope. Commanded by a Brigadier-General Elias Zamani, it is one of the largest, if not the largest
military deployments since the Nigeria-Biafra War. At last count, from Warri to the southern reaches of the
Delta, over 10,000 troops are deployed. Some estimates have the number as high as 13,000. The troops
include SSS, Mobile Police Units, Nigerian Navy and Directorate of Military Intelligence officers . With
at least one of the Nigerian Airforce�s 14 Mi-34 and Mi-35 gunships stationed within striking distance of most
Delta locations, and 2 Naval Augist helicopters and patrol boats (including vessels supplied unwisely by the United
States Government), the strategy has veered between stop-and-search, towards search-and-destroy missions.
On occasion, faced with direct frontal and/or running raids by Ijaw troops, the Navy and Army have pulled back
their positions.
Who are the combatants? Broadly speaking, troops of the Federated Ijaw nations are facing off against Nigerian troops.
Allied with the Nigerians forces, in reality or via perception, are the Itshekiris. Other groups have being
caught up in the war or have willfully chosen sides. Both sides conduct raids on towns in and around Warri,
as well as isolated villages deep in the mangrove forests of the Delta. The Ijaw forces over the last 3 years
have built up an arsenal of weaponry including Rocket Propelled Grenades, machine Guns, automatic weapons and the
ubiquitous Ak-47 assault rifle. The Ijaw forces, flying the Adaka Boro flag, have hurt the Nigerians as well
as periodically disrupting oil flows at one point in early 2003, slicing 40% of daily production.
The Nigerians through Itshekiri proxies have also occasionally scored
hits against the Ijaws. Since the 2003 fast boat Ijaw assault on the Warri waterfront, the Nigerian military
has reinforced its positions, shifted additional military assets to the region, and is said to be preparing for
a more aggressive military campaign. The Ijaw political leadership, perhaps sensing the coming confrontation
has recently signaled its intentions to implement the 1998 Kaiama Declaration�s self-determination clause. At present, a date for the declaration
of independence has not being announced, but Ijaw leaders have resolved to go down that road. The Nigerian
side has tried to dismiss it as old fashioned criminal activities related to oil bunkering, but the evidence clearly
suggests otherwise.
VIII.
Sharia
Despite Mr. Obasanjo�s initial protestations and promises, the advocates of Sharia have not yielded an inch.
In fact, many states with Sharia laws have pushed to extend them to all residents of their states, in clear contravention
of their previous position that only the Muslim faithful need observe the dictates of Sharia. As a result,
periodically in a number of states, hotels, bars, and other �immoral� assets owned by Christians, usually Igbos
or other southern Nigerians, have been destroyed by fire. As a result of the implementation of Sharia, Nigeria effectively functions as at least 2 separate countries. Coupled with the direct undermining
of the judicial system by officers of the state such as Mr. Balogun, the Inspector-General of Police, it is no
surprise that the number of Nigerians who have confidence in the system�s ability to protect them is dwindling.
IX.
Volume of Weapons Smuggling Rising
Since 1999 and particularly in the last 12 months, the volume of arms
and ammunition discovered during routine traffic stops have been nothing but astonishing. In one major find,
over 500,000 rounds of ammo where discovered in a truck with a few dozen assault rifles. Evidence gathered
by a number of researchers support the claim that a number of groups in Nigeria are arming themselves either
in a coordinated fashion, or as protection from the fallout of a high probability collapse of the Nigerian state.
Conclusion
The evidence is growing of a widespread and systematic undermining of the Nigerian state, as well as the breakdown
of law, order, and other tenets of a functional state. The collapse of the Nigerian state increasingly appears
but a question of time.