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How
SSS worked for Radio Kudirat - Fayemi
Dr. Kayode Fayemi.
Does the name ring a bell?
Not quite, many would say.
But hardly would any Nigerian home and abroad claim ignorance of both Radio Freedom and Radio Democracy
International which later transformed into Radio Kudirat during the reign of
terror in the country under the government of General Sani Abacha. Living in exile during that period,
with the support of the democratic forces in and outside Nigeria, Fayemi was
the soul brain behind the pirate radio stations - Radio Freedom and Radio
Kudirat - which sent jitters down the spine of the oppressive government. Ever since he returned to the country
some four years ago, he had refused to say a word about the stations and the
roles he played. Even when SAKIBU OLOKOJOBI arrived his residence for an
interview last Sunday, he dubbed the issue of the stations a no- go-area. But when the interview got underway and
the reporter sneaked in a question on the radio stations, he broke his
promise. By the time he recovered,
he had let enough scoop out . He
later remarked: “I cannot imagine I’ve told you all these. Many people had tried to get me to do
this and I decided not to. Not
because I think there is anything to it, I just felt it is a matter for the
record and it is important to write on it. I also owe it to a lot of people who are the unsung heroes
of the Nigerian struggle.” Excerpts:
ou are the head of the Centre for Democracy and Development, what does this organisation really do?
By the very name of our organisation, we are a
research, training and advocacy organisation, primarily dedicated to questions
of democratisation, development and human security across the West African
sub-region. We do a lot of work on public policies, both at the national and
regional level. We work closely
with ECOWAS on development of norms and values. We work with a variety of governments in the sub-region. We work with the international
community. We have an observer
status with the African Union. We
have a consultative status with the United Nations. We work with the European Union. We work with a range of people.
Here in Nigeria, we’ve been known for our work
on advising government on a number of things. But also, primarily for the background work which we did for
the Oputa Commission when the Nigerian government decided to investigate past
human rights violations.
Before we go into other issues, we would like
you to go into the Radio Kudirat project which you played a major role in during the
oppressive days of Gen. Sani Abacha.
How did it all start and what roles did you play?
If you would allow me, I’ve often said to
people that the story of Radio Kudirat will be told, and you are, probably the first person
I’m going to tell this to. The story of Radio Kudirat will be known fully next year. I’ve spent the past years
working. I’ve been on
sabatical for most of this year and its really writing and reflecting about
what happened in all our years in exile.
Suffice it to say that I was not just involved in the establishment of Radio
Kudirat, I was
primarily the person who organised and ran Radio Kudirat. But I also did things before then. You may be aware that there was Radio Freedom before Radio Kudirat, and Radio Freedom was limited to Lagos. The story will also be told about how
we did all these pretty soon.
Nigerians really have a right to know about all these.
Are you writing a book on it or what?
I’m writing something on it. It will be known very soon what that
is. I’m sure you’ve
read all kinds of stories - apocryphal stories, anecdotal stories about who did
what and why in Radio Kudirat. But I think it is important for us to tell our own story;
it is important for Nigerians to know about that moment in history because when
you look around and you see the behaviour of our politicians now, you would
wonder if they would be behaving this same way if they’d been actively
involved in the struggle for this freedom that we all seem to be enjoying. I find some of what they do to be very
irresponsible and I attribute that to the fact that many of them never really
played any active role. They would
have held this freedom much more seriously than they do if they had really
suffered to get it.
I’ve been reluctant to tell the story over the
four years of my return to the country.
There is a simple reason for my reluctance: I wasn’t really sure that the time was ripe for
Nigerians to know about this thing.
I think this civilian rule is being consolidated in one way or the other
and it’s probably necessary to begin to tell some of these stories so
that we can learn lessons and prepare for the fire next time.
Unlike other major actors in the fight against
the regime of Abacha, much is not known about you. How did you go into exile. Was there any direct threat to your life then or was it that
you were based abroad?
You are right, not much is known about me. I’m just one of the workers for
democracy and freedom. But I think
it is also true that I did not set out of Nigeria because there was any direct
threat to my life. As a matter of
fact, when I left Nigeria in 1989 for the United Kingdom, it was to, primarily,
go for doctorate studies abroad. Before then I was here in Lagos working for a
firm of management consulatant; I was a journalist too. And before then, I was
a student union leader in the university, and I’d always been involved in
really understanding my environment and to figure out why we were where we were
at that time and not making progress. Going abroad just clarified a number of
issues for me and what I thought we could do. Not quite a year abroad, we set up the really first active
political movement since the independence period when they used to have the
West Africa Students Union etc.
Most groups that had been in the UK in the 80s were primarily groups
that just promoted socio-cultural and ethnic solidarity. We broke that chain when we set up the
New Nigerian Forum. We were
radical. We were mostly students,
and most of us were doctoral students. We ran a journal, Nigeria Now, which I
edited and it became a defining
political journal on events in Nigeria throughout the early 90s. We were quite
active and the regime became worried because for the first time, you had a
group that began to really sensitise the Nigerian and international public
about what was going on in Nigeria.
Our colleagues in Nigeria were also in the process of starting the
campaign for democracy. This was
1991. Before then we had had human
rights driven groups, Civil Liberties Organisation, Campaign for the Defence of
Human Rights etc. Things were
coalescing and we became like the external wing of the democracy movement, way
before NADECO came up; way before prominent leaders in exile like Wole Soyinka
and Anthony Enahoro joined us out there.
Specifically, how did you start the Radio
Freedom and Radio Kudirat projects?
You would recall that in 1993, things were pretty
fluid. We’d had the
annulment, we had tried our hands on all sort of things. The press was really experiencing a lot
of repression back home and the government had a total monopoly of the
electronic media; there were no private radio stations. There were private newspapers, but most
of them were underground. People
had a limited means of knowing what was going on in the country. And we in the New Nigerian Forum had
started discussing alternative means of presenting the true picture of what was
happening in Nigeria - pre and post annulment (of June 12, 1993 election won by
M.K.O. Abiola). One of us, Olu
Oguibe, had come into the country in December 1992, on our request, to meet
with groups cladestinely, and discuss things they felt we could do outside. There was unanimity across the board
from the likes of older colleagues like Alao Aka Bashorun, Beko Ransome Kuti,
to younger colleagues like Chima Ubani, Olisa Agbakoba and such other leading
light in the movement. They said
one thing that you could really do for us, we don’t know how you’re
going to do it, was figure out how we could have a radio. That could at least serve as an
alternative means of propaganda and a true record of events in this
country.
Olu came back and briefed the house - our regular
meetings. We discussed it. That was in December 1992. And don’t forget that in December
1992, (Gen. Ibrahim) Babangida had just postponed, yet again, the end of his
transition, and he had announced that we were going to have a transition
council to start on January 2,
1993. He did that with Chief
Sonekan. So, we started exploring
ways of doing this. That did not materialise
even though we did all our research.
Primarily, I was saddled with the responsibility of organising a
radio. It didn’t materialise
until it further dawned on us after the annulment just down the road on June
12, 1993. This was January when
Olu came back and we were discussing how we would go about this.
At that time, I was also very active in my local
community. I was the leader of the
residence in the part of London where I was living, and this brought me in
contact with a range of interesting characters including those who used to run
what we called, in the UK, pirate radio stations. These are illegal radio stations operating from a range of
places. Through my contact with
those groups, some of them living on the estate where I was resident at the
time, I found out how to put together a radio station at a minimal cost and in
a very mobile way. Although it
would just be a Frequency Modulation radio station that would probably cover a
range of about 30 miles radius or 50 miles radius depending on the
kilohertz. We started working with
some of this groups, trying to put some money together and we eventually had a
breakthrough. Although we knew how
to get a frequency modulation station, we spent a great deal of our time,
initially, looking for how to put together a short wave radio, which will have
a wider range. And some of my
contacts in the political movement assured us that we could have something
around Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire, at the time. I was quite frequent in the region, but I couldn’t
come home. None of that, however,
bore any fruit. We couldn’t
get a short wave radio.
Meanwhile, things had become really tough at
home. The repression had really
led to August 27; Babangida had stepped aside, our campaign had intensified
abroad, many of the leaders of the demcoracy movement at home had been taken
into jail. But then, the time some
of them came out in the heat of the Abacha coup was when we had a
breakthrough. So, we got the radio
put together.
What was the cost like?
At a minimal cost. It wasn’t a lot of money. We probably put the radio together for about
£5,000. That is talking
about the technical side of Radio Freedom. There
were a lot of things you had to transport down here, you had to do a lot of
reconnaissance work, we had to get a very cladestine location here in Lagos, we
had to put the things that will be responsible for this in Lagos together. And it was like a military
operation. Remember that we were
dealing with a government that was really repressive. Some of the people who were involved in these, and to whom I
give a lot of credit for whatever
we are enjoying now, in spite of the gaps that we still have, you don’t
even hear of them.
You said you had a breakthrough at a point in
time?
Yes, we had breakthrough. We came, of course, I said I couldn’t come here. We came, we tested the Radio Freedom. This was 1994 and early 1995. We tested the radio in a neighbouring country.
Which of the countries?
One of our neighbouring countries. There were interesting and hair raising
moments during this period.
Although I couldn’t come into this country, the plane that brought
me in when I was bringing in the materials needed for Radio Freedom, actually stopped over in Lagos,
even though they were not meant to stop over here. We were meant to first go to my destination in West Africa
and the plan was to then finally land in Lagos and drop passengers. But for a strange technical reason, the
plane decided to come to Lagos first before going to my destination. And you can imagine how terribly
scared....
How did you feel?
It was a horrible feeling. I had to reflect on my life, I had to reflect on many
things, and I had come to the conclusion that I would try and fight if they
came in to get me.
Fight in what sense? Were you armed?
Let’s leave all of that. I had sensitive materials on me. Let’s leave it that way. Some of the materials I had on me were
dismantled and separated, and you may not be able to connect them. But my luggage had a tag, so they could
trace it. And of course I had to
go to the pilot and ask why we stopped here. I had to confide in him that I was not allowed to come to this
country, and he assured me that nobody could come in and pick you on that
flight. But I was so scared. We stayed in Lagos for about 45 minutes
and for me, those were the longest 45 minutes I ever spent in my life. It was courage under fire. I had to think through many
things. I’d had a little son
then, Folajimi; he was barely three, four months. My wife, Olabisi, even though very politically active, didn’t
know the details of this part of my involvement and I’d refused to.... At
that time, our marriage was just about five years old. This part of my involvement was
something I didn’t discuss freely, even within the forum. Although I discussed it initially,
collectively, it became a case of dealing on a need to know basis, rather than
operating in a public fashion.
Although, members of the forum knew that I was involved in organising
something, but didn’t know the details of my involvement. One or two other people who had come into exile
had been directly involved with me.
One is an ex-general in the military who was quite involved. He was an ex-general who was quite
active in the opposition movement.
Was it General Alani Akinrinade?
You will find out in my book. The two of us were the central
players.
You were talking about how you had an hair
raising moment when you had a stop over in Lagos. What then happened?
After the 45 minutes passed and we took off. I finally got to my destination and my
colleagues were already waiting at the airport, also quite shocked. They had learnt that the plan had made
a detour to Lagos rather than come direct to my destination. Anyway, we were able to get out of the
airport and that country. We did
our test. But unknown to us, the
Nigerian security system were informed of our activities in the neighbouring state
and they actually saw us. When the
Nigerian security operatives came to our hotel, don’t ask me how they
knew where we were, they were very polite to the army general. We knew that beneath that mien of
decency and respect was a very vicious determination to, one, know what we were
doing; two, probably get rid of us.
It was the period after NUPENG, PENGASSAN strike, so the Abacha
government had lost its collegial facade it used to come in to office. The government
had become more repressive and had decided to fight with everything within its
means.
Anyway, again, we managed to shake off our friends
from Nigeria. Our colleagues went back in the country, and Radio Freedom started operation. It was a very limited operation but it
sent shivers down the spine of the regime. The fact that we could operate in Lagos, with all the
difficulty of moving the radio from one point of Lagos to another was really
credit to some of the most resourceful young Nigerians that I’ve ever
worked with.
Who were these people?
You will know about them. You would have to wait for that information. I have chosen to write about this now
because Nigerians had no clue what we went through.
How did Radio Freedom metamorphose into Radio Kudirat?
Well, as I said, Radio Freedom was very limited; Radio Freedom was just for Lagos. We just wanted to demonstrate to our
people who were fast becoming struggle weary. If you recall, by June 12, 1995, Abacha had really
entrenched himself. NUPENG and
PENAGASSAN had been crushed, so to speak.
Many of our leaders were in detention. Those who were not in detention were outside the
country. NADECO had set up an
international operation in United Kingdom and the United States. And CD was in disarray; it had split
into two. We were really at the
nadir of democratic struggle and that really buoyed the spirit of the movement
and the spirit of the people generally.
The operation of Radio Freedom was symbolic. It was only symbolic because it did not go beyond
Lagos. We thought it needed to be
more than that if we were to really have the kind of impact we wanted to have
and not allow the government to use the divide and rule tactics and people
would say the operation was a Lagos-centric, Yoruba affair.
So, we began to look into the possiblility of how to
run a short wave radio. We also
had the advantage of covering more than Nigeria if we were able to run the
radio. But it wasn’t something we could do on our own.
Abacha had also helped us by the viciousness of his
government that some countries in the international scene, not the big ones
that people always talk about when they talk about support for democracy, began
to notice. By the end of November
1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa was killed, and that really gave a fillip to our
struggle. When Ken was killed, the
base of our operation was expanded.
It called the attention of others who were not really interested in the
restoration of M.K.O. Abiola for whatever reason.
There were one or two governments that got
interested. We had been shopping
around, we had been doing a lot of investigations. We knew there were radio stations like this, we were aware
of Radio Burma which
was operating somewhere in Europe.
We were aware of a station run by some rebels in SriLanka. We were aware of a number of other
radio stations. In fact, I became
somewhat of an expert on how to put these things together. I’d gone to talk to a rebel radio
in Latin America. I’d spoken
to some Burmese and they gave us a clue as to how they started Radio Burma and we followed that lead.
In 1995, we had the advantage of having a big
masquerade in the person of Wole Soyinka around. Although I could do the detail work... Olaokun Soyinka ( a medical
doctor and son of Wole Soyinka) and I were primarily responsible for the
initial research for organising a short wave radio. I was primarily responsible
for potential funders across the world.
We had a breakthrough again in early 1996. One of the governments got interested, but we needed to
utilise the influence of our big gun.
Don’t ask me which
government because it’s also one of the things you have to find out in my
book.
One of the government got interested and we know how
people at that level reason. Kayode
Fayemi is a nobody. I could
convince people in the middle rank in these foreign ministries and development
agencies. But then when it came to
the issue of the political decision that had to be taken by the state, you
needed to put together your much prominent group. You can give that to Professor Soyinka. He’d been involved of and on in
this discussions over the past years.
When we set up Radio Freedom, we briefed him on what was going on. He wasn’t a direct player in any
of this, but as a leader of the struggle, he put all of his weight behind all
the efforts we were making. I
approached him and said are you willing to go with me to this country and meet
with the political leaders. I said
we had to really sell this thing, and I couldn’t think of any other
person who could do it better than yourself. He said, “Well.” We gave him a date, he said, “Okay.” We went and he did a marvelous job. We
got the pledge right on the spot.
We got the money and now had to put the technical operation in
place.
We had two other colleagues who had been off and on
involved in the struggle. They
were primarily business people, business people with a conscience. They are Richard Dayo Johnson and
George Noah. They had broadcast
background and they were very useful in the project.
We launched on June 12, 1996. And it wasn’t Radio Kudirat when we launched it, it was Radio
Democracy. It became Radio Kudirat because we decided to name it after
Kudirat (wife of MKO Abiola) after she was murdered in Lagos. That was, essentially, how we started Radio
Kudirat. The reach was wide and it was an
expensive operation. Hugely and
much more expensive than Radio Freedom. It was
also more effective. It was just a
month after we started that the then Minister of Special Duties, Wada Nas,
addressed a press conference about me.
That was, probably, the first time I got the widest prominence in the
Nigerian media.
Wada Nas said I was in Badagry or I was coming over
to Badagry to set up some cells, and that I was meeting with some of my
colleagues in the Campaign for Democracy.
The truth of the matter was that I wasn’t even visiting around
that time. What was true was that
he named two organisations that had been supportive of our work generally: The United Endowment for Democracy in
the United States (which had supported the activities of the CD and other
groups at home) and the Westminister Foundation for Democracy, that’s a
UK based organisation. At that
time, we never got a single penny for Radio Kudirat from those groups. Wada Nas did not even mention the two
countries that were primarily responsible for funding Radio Kudirat.
When we read reports about the press conference, we
just laughed our heads off because we saw that he had no clue about what was
going on. But you could not
underrate Nigerian security and intelligence operatives. Which was why I had operated largely on need-to-know basis. And this had its own impact. It created division within our own
group. Some people thought I was
doing a one man show. For me, the contrary was the case. If I wanted to be a victim, I
didn’t want to put other colleagues, who were doing other equally
important work in the situation where their security would be compromised. I only tried to limit the level of
compromise we would get ourselves into.
How would you assess the level of success of
the radio?
The level of success is really very difficult to
measure. We could not really
figure out how much success we had but I think we did a number of things that
could be said to be successful.
One was the listenership.
We knew this because we used to get letters regularly from all parts of
Nigeria. We got feedback from the
blind in Funtua, from the fishermen in the Delta; of course, there was an active
audience in the western part of the country. We also discovered that what they used to say about the
North and radio was actually quite true.
We had a huge audience listening to Radio Kudirat in the North and these was really
breaking down psychological barriers because we were very careful to ensure
that Radio Kudirat broadcast in almost every language that we could find somebody in
Nigeria to broadcast in. I doubt if there is any radio
station in this country that broadcasts in as in many languages as Radio
Kudirat did. We broadcast in Ogoni, Ibo, Hausa,
Yoruba, Anang, Tiv, Ibibio, Edo etc.
In actual fact, anybody we could grab, who could speak any Nigerian
language we took the person to Radio Kudirat and got him to do something.
Who was doing the Hausa broadcast?
It’s somebody who used a pseudonym, Dan Mamman. He’s my
colleague, Tajudeen Abdulraheem.
He is from Funtua.
Ironically, he is related to Wada Nas. Technology had improved, so he did it from all over the
world. Wherever he was, he would do his broadcast and send it in.
We did that.
We felt that we were able to bridge the gap in a significant sense. I think Radio Kudirat did more than that. It was also a preventive measure. One of the things that used to happen
to us was that there were people, ironically, in the intelligence services who
did not have enough confidence in the local media, or felt they might be caught
if the information was misused.
So, they sent us stuffs via all kind of means. We got some information
even before the signals got to their stated copies. We got signals on how they
were monitoring bulldog or monitoring antelopes. We also knew
that they had moles in our midst and we were very careful. London was also crawling with
security operatives. If you look
at the names of the people on the diplomatic lists, you would realise that the
so called library assistant, information attache etc, about 40 of them were SSS
or NIA operatives.
We got advance notice of plans to eliminate Chief
Abraham Adesanya, and we broadcast it before it happened. The chief had said in a number of
interviews that the first time he heard that there was a plot to assassinate
him was on Radio Kudirat, and a few days after that the attempt took place.
We also had advance information that Chief Abiola was
going to be poisoned. This
information we didn’t use.
We really agonised over not using this information because we wanted to
check the veracity even when it came from a very reliable source. We weighed it , discussed it and asked
if it was what we should use or investigate a little further. I think in the end we opted to hold
back on it, and we didn’t use it.
How did you feel that Abiola was poisoned
eventually, considering that broadcasting it could have, perhaps, prevented it?
We agonised over that. We blamed ourselves for not using it. I take full responsibility. I really was not directly involved in
the programmatic end of Radio Kudirat operation. I
was involved in the big picture: I
was the fund raiser, I was the ones meeting the governments and organising all
kinds of name to make sure the radio had a proper arrangement to function. So, when the information came, the
editor of Radio Kudirat, a very decent individual who is also quietly sitting somewhere in this
country now, contacted me and asked what we could do about the information I
sent to him. The source was
directly contacting me. By the
time I spoke with the contact, he said it was from the right source. But in the heat of the confusion of the
death of Abacha and Abdulsalami taking over.... I still blame myself for not
giving the authority to use that information, but I did that in a very very
informed manner because I’d spoken to our leaders. I’d spoken to Chief Enahoro,
I’d spoken to Professor Soyinka.
I discussed with some of our leaders in the movement whether it was the
right thing to do and they felt we should investigate it a little further. Unfortunately, it was too late. By the time we heard of the tea or no
tea episode, chief had passed away.
You were one of those who fought the battle for
democracy. Now, how would you
assess the nation’s
democracy after over four years?
I believe that we’ve come some way, and I
believe that if we were to take democracy as a process rather than an event, we
are probably where we ought to be given the nature of the move towards
democracy in 1999. In my view, we
didn’t do what we were meant to do.
I was one of those opposed to election in 1999 because I didn’t
really feel election could automatically lead us in the direction of
democracy. I thought election
might achieve a civilian rule but in a country that had experienced prolonged
authoritarian rule for 15 consecutive years, I felt there were issues we needed
to address.
Prior to that, I was also modestly involved in
bringing our leaders, who had just come out of jail, together, when they were
released by Abdulsalami in 1998. I
organised a meeting in London for the leading light of the demcoracy movement,
and it was attended by virtually all of them - Soyinka, Chief Enahoro, Beko
Ransome Kuti, Olisa Agbakoka, Frederick Fasehun... I organised this meeting
under the rubric of the Center for Democracy and Development. At the time we were operating from
outside the country.
We had a very very full and frank discussion for two
days, and it was clear that we didn’t have consensus. Even among ourselves, there were those
who immediately saw the platform to return home and participate in politics,
and they couldn’t see the point in us arguing that it wasn’t time
and that we should utilise the opportunity that we had and force the national
conference agenda on the table. If
we’d resolved that, we would have a national government and the national
government would be saddled with the responsibility of organising a proper election. We went the other way and we ended up
where we are.
For me, I don’t see anything that could have
gone the other way. We’d
trod the path that would lead to where we are. That is why when our colleagues get annoyed that things have
turned out this way, I always say to them that what we had was transition
without transformation; we cannot expect transformation if we didn’t take
steps that ought to have led to transformaion. Should we go back and reverse it? No! But I’m happy that a lot more people are warming
up to the idea of a national conference even from the most unlikely
quarters. People are also
realising that electoral democracy, in and of itself, would not lead to the
kind of dividend that our ordinary people want unless we address the structural
issues that underguide the weaknesses of the Nigerian state.
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