What next in Iraq?
ON Monday, June 28, 2004, the United States of America, leading the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relinquished its direct authority in Iraq to an interim government under the leadership of Ayad Allawi, 48 hours ahead of the scheduled inauguration date of June 30, 2004. The formal transfer of sovereign authority ceremony over, the American ex-administrator, Paul Bremer, hurriedly jumped into a military plane and left Iraq, which he had directly administered for upward of 14 months.
Although the two major leaders of the CPA, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, have taken a sanguine view of the "successful formal handover in Baghdad", which both of them described as "a day of great hope for Iraqis and a day that terrorist enemies never hoped to see", we are persuaded that the success of the interim government and the "great hope for Iraqis", which Bush and Blair are optimistic about, are contingent upon a number of factors which, at any rate, must have regard to the enormity of the socio-economic and political problems created by the ill-advised, ill-considered and defiant invasion of Iraq by the Coalition Forces at the expense of the independence and the equipoise of nations.
The US and Britain insisted there were weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq in spite of the UN inspectors' reports to the contrary, and, despite the UN's strong opposition, both countries and their allies invaded Iraq, foisting untold hardship on the Iraqis, killing tens of hundreds of them, destroying property worth billions of dollars and rendering a sizeable crop of Iraqis homeless.
An untoward upshot of the US invasion of Iraq consisted in such counterproductive policies with regard to the war against terrorism, which have caused incalculable loss of American prestige and occasioned a betrayal of the American and Iraqi people and the troops on the scene. The invasion and occupation of Iraq has, as it were, constructed a gateway to violence in and outside Iraq that will be terribly difficult to shut.
Now, the CPA has transferred sovereign power to Iraqi nationals, leaving behind a wrecked economy and a debilitating insurgency. The success or otherwise of Ayad Allawi's interim government will depend largely on factors, such as the availability of funds for the reconstruction effort. However, even where there are adequate funds to rebuild Iraq, the reconstruction effort would definitely fail if Iraq's central problem " pervasive insecurity " remains unsolved.
In that unfortunate event, the new government would be seen as impotent, reconstruction effort would be hampered, daring insurgents would become more brazen-faced and there might be no elections in January 2005. The possible net result of all this might be widespread disaffection, which could lead to a low-level civil war or military rule, or possibly both. Indeed, Ayad Allawi, leader of the interim government, has acquired powers that would allow him impose martial law. This step, we are further persuaded, would be counterproductive as violence begets violence. Allawi and his team should do what the United States and its allies were unable to do " seek dialogue with the insurgents.
Ayad Allawi's efforts at restoring peace to Iraq will, nonetheless, include some tough measures to curb the excesses of inveterate groups. Above all, the US should make good its promise to rebuild Iraq. Of the over 3,000 projects which the US pledged to execute in post-war Iraq, only about 240 are on course. It may, however, be argued that the perilousness associated with Iraq since the end of the war in May, last year, has been the rub. Even so, the point should be made that the few on-going projects are being executed by the cronies of the Bush Administration.
The interim government of Ayad Allawi should be not only independent and extricated from the trammels of external influence, but must be clearly seen to be so. Allawi should shun the lure of office and power and work towards organising free and fair elections in January, next year. Above all, the United Nations should put behind it the US intransigence and unilateral action in Iraq and set in motion machinery to enthrone peace and political stability in that country. It should, for good measure, get passionately involved in the reconstruction and rehabilitation effort.
As for the object lessons of the Iraq War, there is no doubt that all powerful nations, including the US and Britain, have been given fair warning against the subversion of the sovereignty of an independent nation-state, particularly when such an action fails to receive the imprimatur of the UN, a credible supra-national organisation.
It is pertinent to note that since the war against Iraq ostensibly ended in May 2003, over 800 US citizens (soldiers and civilians) and countless Iraq citizens had been killed before the formal handover of political power to an indigenous Iraqi interim government and before the Americans tore up the miles from Iraq to the US.
The attitude of the Iraqi insurgents to the CPA since May 2003, at any rate, dramatised the inevitability of invincible reprisal actions against any aggressive or occupation force, however potent. Since the Iraq War, the whole world, not just Iraq, has become much less safe than before it. The UN, through the Security Council and the General Assembly, should square up to the occasion and help restore sanity to the global family.
