| Why Abacha fired me,
by M.C Alli
By FEMI ADESINA
Monday, July 12, 2004
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| M.C Alli |
| Sun News Publishing |
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Erstwhile Chief of Army Staff and Plateau State Sole Administrator,
Major-General M.C Alli lost his position as Army Chief due
to a dirty power game, suspicion and perceived disloyalty
to the Gen. Sani Abacha regime.
“I was to see General Sani Abacha on one of my evenings
in Abuja at Aso Rock and he did the talking in his characteristic
shorts words. He stressed three issues: he accused me of trying
to release Chief M.K.O Abiola from detention, both Gen. Diya,
Alex Ibru and I were the spearheads. Gen. Abacha was worried
that I was telling officers and men that he was unwilling
to release funds for the welfare of the Nigerian Army, finally
and more ridiculous of all, he accused me of posting officers
loyal to me to strategic positions with its attendant insinuations.
I was as disgusted as I was taken aback. I knew before now
that it was a matter of time before I would be moved from
the office of the Chief of Army Staff. General Alani Akinrinade
had warned me of impending changes. My friend and former secretary
to the Government of Plateau State, Dr. Dalhatu Araf, had
also forewarned me that my sacking was in the offing. Gen.
Abacha did not trust me. With a directive to the State Security
Service, they had commenced the circulation of false propaganda
on my administration in the Army. This was with the connivance
of a few senior officers who felt they would fit the bill
of Chief of Army Staff in peace and tranquility for the Commander
in Chief.
“After his delivery of my failings, I stared at him
for about thirty seconds in disbelief. I did not offer any
explanation because at this point, I too could no longer influence
or contribute to good governance. It is a miracle, and a measure
of his reverence for me that he did not order my immediate
arrest on the spot in response to my demeanour. As soon as
it was politely expedient to do so, I quickly excused myself
from his presence.”
The above account is containded in Chris Alli’s memoirs,
The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army, published by Malthouse.
Alli, who became Army Chief in December, 1993, says by June
1994, he had gradually put his personal belongings together
and was ready to leave. When the crunch was about to come,
three options came to mind.
“I discussed the options opened to me with Dolly, my
wife. The options were limited. One was to stage a pre-emptive
coup d’etat. For obvious reasons of principle, I ruled
this option out. The second option was to resign. This was
also ruled out, for reasons of the obvious repercussions.
It was not because there would be any spontaneous reaction
to this course of action from the Army. The Army, in fact,
had become privatised to any incumbent head of state, monetised
and materialised. There was no need to project a personal
agenda on the Army and the nation. The third option was to
hang on. I decided instead to concentrate my efforts on Army
matters rather than political and governmental issues. I reasoned
that Gen. Abacha, as the leader, would ultimately bear the
burden or glory of his failures and successes.”
Before he was fired, Alli says his telephone lines had been
bugged and his personal Guard Battalion at Bonny Camp, commanded
by Lt. Col. Jubrin Yakubu “had been bought over and
his unit was alert and prepared to resist any measures I would
contemplate.
”
On August 24, 1994, he was eventually removed as Army Chief.
He records events of that day thus:
“Before the start of the last PRC meeting on 24 August,
1994, General Abacha had scheduled interviews with the Chief
of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Allison Madueke, and myself.
The die was cast, we were informed that we were no longer
to hold on to our respective positions in the services and
government. As I listened to General Abacha reel out the rationale
for relieving me of Army command, my inner thoughts contemplated
his situation and the pity I felt for him. I felt so because,
in spite of my position in the military hierarchy, it was
becoming increasingly difficult for me to define where the
administration was heading and what it stood for. Even members
of the Ruling Council could not say with any exactitude where
General Sani Abacha derived advice for his various actions,
and who his advisers were.
“At the last meeting of the Provisional Council, we
had reeled out a catalogue of the administration’s failures
in governance. The issues I raised covered all aspects of
national enterprise, following up in his train, the service
chiefs and the Inspector-General of Police spoke eloquently
on our poor performance. General Diya was the only member
of the PRC who did not speak. At some point, he was excused
from the meeting of military members of the PRC. Each speaker
also offered suggestions, but it was clear that our concerns
were an indictment of General Abacha’s leadership and
pace. As usual, in his incoherent response, he sought to remind
us of the need for loyalty and security as primary factors
for regime stability. Utter disillusionment had at this time
set in on the so-called Provisional Ruling Council. Among
the service chiefs, we had earlier, at a social meeting in
the residence of the Chief of Air Staff, Femi John Femi, come
to a conclusion that General Sani Abacha was incompetent.
I made the statement and all concurred.
“In my last meeting with General Abacha when we were
relieved of our positions, he repeated his reasons for my
removal. Once more he accused me of planning to release Chief
Abiola from detention, telling service officers that funds
were short in coming and accused me of positioning my men
in strategic positions. In addition, he said that I was carrying
out some postings of officers without his knowledge. I reminded
him that there was a fourth one he may have ignored, which
was that I was planning a coup. He replied that he was not
aware of the latter, and was not informed. He lied. I thanked
him for the opportunity to serve as Chief of Army Staff. I
assured him that whatever I did in the period was guided by
the principles from which I interpreted every situation. Sitting
on my side of the writing-table, separating us from the head
of state, was General Oladipo Diya who wore an inscrutable
countenance. His remark, when I finished responding to General
Abacha was: “You see, I told you.” What he intended
to achieve by that remark, or, what he meant, I still cannot
fathom till today. He probably meant to defend me. I had a
clear one-month foreknowledge that this was going to happen.
From other sources, I also knew that the Chief Abiola imbroglio
had shaken his faith in the entire military members of the
PRC, or so I thought. I was therefore mentally and morally
ready for the change when it came.”
What is Alli’s assessment of Abacha as a man and of
his regime?
“General Sani Abacha had the patience of a hook-line
fisherman or a bush hunter, and the memory of an elephant
and a native cunning to match. His patience verged on the
ludicrous and sometimes utter imperviousness. You are tempted
to regard it with trepidation. After the members of the PRC
had completed negotiations with the Nigeria Labour Congress,
it was agreed that the Congress would call off the nationwide
strike. The Head of State was therefore to follow this with
a broadcast to the nation explaining the agreements reached
and the restoration of normalcy. General Abacha suddenly was
inaccessible for three to four clear days. All efforts to
reach him through his Chief Security Officer, Major Al-Mustapha,
and his wife Mrs. Mariam Abacha failed. We were informed that
only his nurse and the chief security officer could reach
him on his sick bed. Even these efforts proved fruitless.
It took more than a week for the PRC to come into any contact
with the Command in Chief. We were yet to be able to convince
him to address the nation. The PRC had prepared a speech for
that purpose. When eventually he condescended to speaking
to the nation, he sacked the PRC in one fell swoop.
We later gathered that he had planned to dismiss the entire
government structure at the time. He always chose his own
time and space on all issues, whether these were occasions
for the new year address to the nation, the budget speech,
response to public restiveness, they meant, for all practical
purposes, nothing to him. He was like an armoured car (mean
battle tank) driver who drove all the time, and in all terrain
in first gear. He had little use for the communication, mobility,
speed and flexibility of the tank. No one in the PRC seemed
to know who his valued advisers were and whose regional or
group interests persuaded his actions. He probably reveled
in wearing everyone out with anxiety before taking action
on any matter.”
•Tomorrow: Alli on how IBB was forced to step aside
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