| How we kicked out IBB,
by MC Alli
By Femi Adesina
Tuesday, July 13, 2004
General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) would not have survived
if he didn’t leave office post-haste on August 26, 1993,
says Major General M.C Alli, the current Sole Administrator
of Plateau State.
Writing in his memoirs, The Federal Republic of Nigeria Army,
published by Malthouse, Alli says Babangida’s reasons
for annulling Basorun M.K.O Abiola’s victory in the
June 12, 1993 presidential election "defied logic"
and further described the act as violating "the will
and sovereign voice of the people of Nigeria and made a mockery
of the factor of choice in a democracy."
According to Alli, he discussed the prospect of removing Babangida
by force with the then Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Salihu Ibrahim,
as IBB "was bent on destroying and ruining the Armed
Forces beyond redemption in gratification of his personal
ambitions." But Salihu Ibrahim was reluctant, and Alli
submits: "By his nature, I knew that coup-making was
not his cup of tea, even if he drank a lot of tea; indeed
he abhorred it and all it stood for. It was also obvious that
he was deeply worried by the state of the Army and the overall
national interest and our political condition. He had absolutely
no faith in General Sani Abacha who by long practice could
easily read coup indicators very well."
Next, Alli discussed removing IBB by force with Sani Abacha,
who was then the Chief of Defence Staff and Minister of Defence.
"On this day, we met in his inner lounge with Lt Gen.
Jeremiah Useni sitting with him. Gradually, as events matured,
it became obvious to me that Gen Sani Abacha had some designs
of his own just as several military interest groups were covertly
expressing strong views against the presidency. My perception
at the time was that Sani Abacha was playing for time and
space and did not consider it expedient to confront Gen. Babangida
frontally."
One thing was, however, crystal clear, according to Alli.
There was palpable dissatisfaction within the Army over the
annulment of Abiola’s election, so if IBB thought his
constituency would back him, he thought wrong.
"One reason was that a majority of officers and men were
bored by the continued dominance of a clique of officers in
the affairs of the nation. They wanted a change to full-blown
democracy, whatever that meant. The second reason was that
in spite of General Babangida’s ‘settlement’
or material bribes, soldiers wanted to return to their professional
roles. Thirdly, most seemed exasperated by Gen. Babangida’s
tantrums and, more importantly, their sudden use as cannon
fodder in Liberia without national approval and strong logistic
support… As General Ishola Williams eloquently questioned
at one of the many senior officers’ gatherings on the
issue, ‘when did it become the function of the Army
to sanction negatively, the will of the Nigerian peoples,
willy-nilly’ "
Apart from Gen. Williams, Alli says other front runners for
a return to professionalism and democratic dispensation were
Col. Abubakar Umar and Gen. Oladipo Diya, and a couple of
others. But he added that there were some other officers who
visited Babangida frequently in Aso Rock, and returned with
"brown envelope large enough to massage respective family
anatomies for a while."
Boxed in from all ends, however, IBB handed power over to
Shonekan and went back to his Minna home, after a less than
impressive pulling out parade.
In March 1994, four months into the Sani Abacha regime, Alli
says the idea to arrest Babangida was mooted by key senior
officers who had been constituted into a Steering Committee,
as he was deemed a security problem to the new regime. But
Abacha did not agree, as he said there was no concrete evidence
to back up the allegation of destabilisation leveled against
IBB.
But Alli submits:"I would have welcomed the incarceration
of General Babangida, not for annulling the election or for
perceived threat to the administration. Rather, I would welcome
it for the premeditated damage brought on the Nigerian Armed
Forces, psychologically and professionally. On this score,
I had appealed to Gen. Abacha on three occasions to bring
him to questioning. He always declined to grant his blessing.
It is still essential, if possible, for the amiable General
to clarify a few matters regarding the management of the Armed
Forces in his time: the castration of the Army, the near-loss
of our coastal sea power and the grounding of the young, tactical
Nigerian Air Force…It is my hope that some day, he would
muster the moral persuasion to explain these conditions to
the nation."
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