I find the use of the phrase "ungoverned areas of Africa" instructive and intriguing. Since there are no parts of Africa that are not part of independent states, the concept of ungoverned must refer to two parameters: The first parameter must refer to coup prone areas, which means instability on the institutional government level, and the second parameter must refer to areas where low intensity insurrection is rampart.
By these two parameters, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe are legitimate areas of interest to the U.S.
It is a fact that Nigeria is a coup prone country. It is a fact that low intensity operations have created a hostile environment to life, property, and investment in the Delta areas.
Equatorial Guinea is also not only coup prone but has just gone through a scare occasioned by allegations that mercenaries were plotting an invasion of the state.
Sao Tome and Principe underwent a coup experience last year and it took the intervention of Nigeria to re-install the government. This was a practical demonstration of the external reach of Nigeria's capability.
Of course, if the U.S. were interested in African countries with a propensity for instability only, the candidates would be unlimited. The U.S., like other states, is not in the business of charity when it comes to issues of national interest.
The extra element that sets the Gulf of Guinea apart is the presence of extremely rich oil reserves. The U.S. had been dependent on oil from the Middle East for most of its domestic consumption. Up and until now, she had sourced for only 15 per cent of its oil imports from Africa and this has been principally from Nigeria and Angola. The latest Iraqi war, the rise of Islamic revolution and the targeting of oil workers and oil installations in Saudi Arabia itself has forced the U.S. to look at possibilities of oil resources elsewhere.
Africa, which in 2000, President George Bush had declared "doesn't fit into the national strategic interests of the U.S." had by 2004 metamorphosed into "undeniable...that African oil has become of national strategic interest to us," according to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner. By tapping into the rich oil fields bounded by Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea, it is estimated that the U.S. could increase its import of African oil to 25 per cent of its total consumption.
Firstly, it was in fact the Chief of Staff of the armed forces of Sao Tome and Principe, who early this year announced that his navy and that of the U.S. would be holding joint naval exercises. This was denied by officials of the U.S. Apart from the fact that it was farcical for a state with a few patrol boats to join in a naval exercise with the most powerful navy in the world, the denial was the first in the hide and seek murky world of military diplomacy.
Secondly, there was the comment by Gen. Charles Wald, the senior U.S. military officer involved in African affairs, that Sao Tome had the potential of becoming another Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian ocean, which the U.S. uses for military operations in Asia, Middle East etc.
Gen. Wald revealed that the Pentagon had what it called "Forward Operating Locations" and that Sao Tome was an ideal candidate to be a Pentagon "Forward Operating Location."
Thirdly, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency is at present financing feasibility studies for the development of a deepwater port and expanded airfield facilities on Sao Tome.
Fourthly, in 2001, the U.S. Department approved the U.S. based Military Professional Resources Inc. a private firm run by former Pentagon military officers, to train those protecting Equatorial Guinea's coast and offshore oil wells.
Fifthly, following the visit of Gen. Carlton Fulford, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the European Command to Sao Tome, the President of that island country announced that he had agreed to the establishment of a U.S. naval base on that island.
I am aware that in national security affairs as well as in diplomacy, duplicity is the order of the day. But two developments have struck me over this matter. The first has been the doublespeak by U.S. and Nigerian officials, and the second has been a refusal by Nigerian authorities to take this issue seriously.
The first reaction by the U.S. embassy was to deny any knowledge of the development. This was also echoed by the Minister of Defence and Nigerian Naval headquarters. Even as late as July 2, the new U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Ambassador John Campbell said "this summer, U.S. Navy is carrying out a world-wide exercise and one of those ships is passing through the Gulf of Guinea. It is way offshore and not even near West Africa."
Ten days later, Gen. Wald, the deputy head of U.S. forces in Europe, flew into Abuja to hold talks with the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr. Ibn Chambers. He also held lunch talks with the Minister of State for Defence, Dr. Rowland Oritsejafor, Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Alexander Ogomudia, Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Martin Agwai, the Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Samuel Afolayan and the Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Marshall Jonah Wuyep.
The visiting U.S. Gen. identified the fight against terrorism as the focus of American interest in the Gulf of Guinea. If we are to believe the U.S. ambassador, all these flurry of activities by highly placed and extremely busy people is just about a ship passing through the ocean.
The second development has been the lack of seriousness attached to this issue by Nigerian authorities. After the spate of initial denials, Nigerian civilian and military authorities went into "downplay" mode. Our minister of information said, "if they want to deploy a military vessel, it is their own business because the Gulf of Guinea is a very vast area." A very senior naval officer also said, "it is no threat to the Nigerian nation. We should not dissipate energy on what is no threat to our country... there is no security implication if they are not coming into our territorial waters. They have the right to deploy their troops as they deem fit."
These views represent a rather restrictive structure as to what national security is all about. I cannot imagine Brazil or India or Pakistan or North Korea or Israel or any serious nation adopting such a laid back approach to an armada even if it is over 200 miles from its coast line.
In spite of efforts by the press to get the National Assembly to take an interest in the issue, none of the committees on defence, intelligence or foreign affairs has taken any interest in holding hearings or briefings on the matter. Compare this with the speed at which various committees of the U.S. Congress started hearings when the scandal broke on the treatment of Iraqi prisoners in prisons under American command.
The way forward
We must start with an admission that Nigeria has not paid sufficient serious attention to the Gulf of Guinea. In fact, we have not paid serious attention to our coastal waters stretching from the contiguous zone to the exclusive economic zone.
The International Maritime Bureau in a May 2004 report identified the Nigerian coast as the most dangerous maritime belt in Africa, having witnessed between January and April 2004, 10 piracy attacks and the deaths of 10 crewmembers including two Americans. Our internal waterways are so infested with coastal pirates that both domestic and world media have focused on domestic pirates whether they see themselves as Robin Hood while government perceives them as Al Capone.
So worried has the U.S. become that it has donated four unarmed U.S. Coast Guard vessels to the Nigerian Navy in order "to support the Nigerian Navy's ability to protect fisheries and the Delta environment, conduct search and rescue operations and counter smuggling activities along the Nigerian coastline."
My interpretation of this gesture was that, the U.S. is only interested in a Nigerian Navy with limited coastal capabilities. How is this compatible with the latest visit of Gen. Wald to Abuja to raise an awareness of the need for anti-terrorist policing of the Gulf of Guinea The U.S. is determined to establish a military and strategic presence in the Gulf of Guinea with minimum contribution by Nigeria.
It is not in Nigerian interest for anyone to establish a military and strategic capability in West Africa that will be beyond the capability of Nigeria to match. Nigeria already has joint oil exploration agreement with Sao Tome and Principe. Nigerian involvement in oil exploration with Sao Tome and Principe has already become a controversial factor in Sao Tome and Principe domestic policy. Can we assume that they will be no disagreements in the future between Nigeria and Sao Tome With a possible United State Forward Operation Base in Sao Tome, would the present strategic balance between Nigeria and Sao Tome be maintained
Could we just analyse the defence and strategic doctrines of medium coastal states and decipher where they draw their security arcs before we conclude that a foreign superpower naval task force presence in an area where we have joint oil exploratory rights and only 750 kilometres from our shore line is no threat to our security
Early July, the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Afolayan, raised two alarms. Firstly, he said the flagship of the Nigerian navy, is the NNS Aradu, which is also its newest is 20 years old. Secondly, he said while the navy would need N40 billion to maintain its equipment, its yearly allocation is only N2 billion. No wonder that the image of the Navy is that of a coastal force. How many years old are the newest ships in the South African, Brazilian, Egyptian, and Indian navies What is the annual budgetary allocation to those navies
The case is so obvious that it cannot be overstated. The Nigerian navy needs more resources to overhaul it and empower it with sufficient capability that it can maintain security of any kind in the Gulf of Guinea.
There is need for the creation of a Coastal Guard to concentrate on anti-piracy activities in our coastal waters and that should include provision of security for oil installations on-shore and in coastal waters. The Navy should be made to concentrate on the deep blue seas. Nigeria does not need a coastal or ceremonial navy.
Gone are the days when we can claim that we have no yardsticks to measure the expected capability of the Nigerian navy. Firstly, it must have the capability to maintain dominance in the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone. Secondly, it must have a fighting capability in those areas where we have considerable economic activity such as the Gulf of Guinea.
My remarks about the state of capability of the navy should not be interpreted to mean that the level of capability of the army and the airforce are sufficient to protect and project Nigeria's external interest. On the contrary, the projections, which I have laid down for the navy, are also applicable to the other arms of the armed forces.
I expect that my recommendations may again spark off the usual debate about the affordability of these recommendations. It is a matter of choice just as it is a matter of priority. Nothing prevents Nigerian from restricting its national interests to its coastline. Nothing prevents Nigeria from spending its vast resources in creating more states with its overheads of political appointees and civil servants and parastatals etc. But those who believe that Nigeria should be a regional power should be prepared to pay for it. I do not believe in clapping with one hand or with no hands.
I am also calling on the various relevant committees of the National Assembly, the War College, and the National Institute for Policy Strategic Studies to hold hearings, workshops, retreats, seminars etc on this issue. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs has set the ball rolling as it did 18 years ago. This issue must not be allowed to rest there. A national consciousness must be aroused and a national consensus must be arrived at.
Finally, I run the danger of being misinterpreted as advocating the pursuit of aggressive means even if the ends, which are the protection of Nigeria's national interests are legitimate. I am not in pursuit of aggression or aggressive means. I have only tried to aggregate President John F. Kennedy's words of strategic wisdom: "Lets us never fear to negotiate but let us never negotiate out of fear." Nations, which have interests that they cannot protect by force, always negotiate out of fear.
- Professor Akinyemi, one time Minister of Foreign Affairs was a Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)
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