One of the greatest obstacles to national integra-tion and political stability in Nigeria is the issue of inequity and unfairness in the subsisting power structure in the country. In the oil rich coastal states of the Niger Delta, the often unamplified contention has been that the people have little or no voice in the decision-making processes in the country and in regard to the way the enormous wealth derived from the oil deposits in their states are allocated, appropriated and utilized by the Federal Government. This scenario might also become applicable to the indigenous populations of some central states like Kogi, Benue, Nassarawa, Plateau, etc, where the prospects of high revenue income from the exploitation of gold, iron ore, coal, edible salt and other solid mineral deposits seem imminent.
Indeed, the perception in many quarters is that political power distribution in the country is lopsided and unfairly skewed in favour of the Northwest zone. Actually, this is more than a perception because in reality the Northwest produces today nearly the same number of House of Representatives members from the Southeast and the South-South put together, or, if you like, the Northeast and the Northcentral put together. The argument is that through adroit manipulation of population figures and unusual juggling of federal representative constituencies, the Northwest was unfairly turned into a super zone and wielders of enormous and unproportionate political power in the Nigerian scheme of things. The statistics speak for themselves. The zonal distribution of the 360 House of Rep. members (Hm) in Nigeria is as follows; Northwest (92 Hm); Southwest (71 Hm); South-South (55 Hm); Northcentral (49 Hm); Northeast (48Hm); Southeast (43 Hm); and the FCT (2 Hm). Little wonder the widespread opposition to the status quo!
In the above regard, the question that crops up is: Are there no steps we could take to bridge the existing disparity of political opportunities and accessibility to power that has for too long worked against national cohesion and consensus-building in Nigeria? Put another way; is there nothing that could be done to allay the resentment of aggrieved segments of the society, especially the so-called minority elements, by way of giving them more voice in the affairs of the union? Indeed, how do we begin to correct the notion that Nigeria's democracy is but the tyrany of the majority; the exploitation and oppression of the minority by a conniving majority?
A diligent study of the axiology of national power readily throws up the three factors of Population size, the Equality of states principle and of course Economic power as the pre-eminent factors that inform or make for national power. Conversely, they remain the relevant factors upon which the distribution of that power among constituent territorial groups in a polity should be based. So far however only two of these factors, Population size and the Equality principle, are generally employed in national power sharing formats, giving rise to unicameral and bicameral legislatures the world over. Of course, what model a nation adopts is largely dependent on the factors of size, diversity and the prevailing ideological climate. But the pertinent question is:
Why is it that the economic power factor has so far been neglected and sidelined in the formulation of power sharing formats amongst nations despite its unquestionable relevance and weight in the organisation of national power?
The truth of the matter is that nations, with the glaring exception of Nigeria and perhaps some other tottering states, generally allow subnational entities to appropriate and manage whatever economic resources that abound within their respective domains, either as collectives or as individuals. In the United States for instance, individuals have the right of ownership and exploitation of whatever minerals that are found within or underneath the individual’s land holding. Of course the individual or the corporate bodies that harness these minerals are expected to pay taxes to governments at the various levels, in varying degrees.
But because individual or subnational economic resources are not directly usurped by the central authority, to build national power, the issue of using the economic index as a factor in the distribution of that power between constituent subnational and territorial groupings does not arise. The point one is making however is that Nigeria has a very peculiar and unique approach in which the central government appropriates or arrogates to itself the power of expropriation over all the mineral wealth found in whatever area of the country as well as decides how the accruing revenue is distributed among the different tiers of government and the nation’s territorial groups. This same yardstick is applied in the handling of VAT and excise revenues derived from the different states of the Federation.
Given the above scenario, and in so far as Nigerian subnationalities are cajoled into surrendering basic economic rights and wealth to the centre, to build and enhance nation power, it is cogent that the process of distributing that power among the federating units in the country must perforce take cognizance of the varying economic contributions made by respective units to the centre. For it is a fundamental axiom in our socioeconomic set-up that the man who bankrolls an enterprise has the majority of that enterprise and therefore a controlling voting power notwithstanding the largeness of the number of the small contributors or shareholders. In effect, it should suffice that in the social, political and economic enterprise called Nigeria, the economic matrix should feature in the power-sharing arrangement; it ought to complement Population size and the Equality principle.
In fact, in my books, Strategy For Political Stability, 1988, and On National Reconciliation And Development (Ideology of the Nigerian Centrist), 2002, where I dealt with the subject of ‘Secondary Distribution of Political Power’ in greater detail, I posited that the inclusion of the economic matrix in Nigeria’s power-sharing format should stand as a veritable ‘ political concession’ needed to ‘justify’ the nation’s apparent claim on the revenues that accrue from mineral deposits in constituent states, as well as the excise and VAT revenues that naturally or normally should belong to respective zones, states and localities. And that the adoption of such a format should go a long way to douse the discontent and grudge which the rich oil producing states, the relatively industrializing states of Lagos and Kano (with high VAT and excise revenues) and the potentially rich coal and iron ore producing states of the Middle Belt might harbour, either now or in the future, towards the Nigeria project.
On the practical side, in view of the facts and nature of social change and the sociological concept of cultural-lag (by which the disparity in the readiness to tolerate innovation or change in different areas of social life may be reckoned), I am going to hereby propose a practical solution, an interim measure or fall-back position which could be adopted at the moment to deal with the nation’s tortuous power-sharing palaver. My notion is that, for now, the population factor should be traded off with the economic power index so that the residual equality principle becomes the sole criterion upon which our power-sharing process is predicated. This will of course give the federating units, hopefully the six geopolitical zones of the country, equal representation in the National Assembly, with each zone having 60 representatives in the Lower House and 18 senators in the Upper House.
This precept, to my mind, should help eliminate the indignation and rancour that attend the persistent application of contentious and fraudulent census or population figures in our national power sharing process. On the other hand, it will also stem the tide of severe dislocation and disruption in social and political structures that are bound to accompany the introduction of the economic matrix into our nation’s power-sharing process. The format should indeed be seen as a compromise formula that should help us tide things over until Nigeria attains maturity; a maturity that must be ratified by the nation’s ability to produce accurate or reliable national demographic data as well as the standardization of its fiscal federalism.
All in all, I am of the firm conviction that the introduction of the format will quicken the process of mustering national solidarity, the achievement of national reconciliation and will ultimately enhance the viability of a Nigeria nation.
