1.1.
Introduction
John Locke�s (1632-1704) contribution to
religion and indeed miracles can be seen in his famous epistemological
treatise, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published in 1690.
Here, his views on miracles could only be sieved in the entire work. However,
in his edited work of 1823, a section has been devoted specifically on
miracles.
Basic for Locke is his distinction of the three types of human knowledge:
�
Intuitive knowledge: as the immediate perception of the
truth in a certain proposition, as in the case with the principle of identity
and principle of non-contradiction;
�
Demonstrative knowledge: of which belongs the existence of
God and moral maxims
�
Sensitive knowledge: the certainty of the existence of
objects outside us, both in its primary qualities (size, number etc) and its
secondary qualities (colour, smell, etc).
Important for Locke and for us in our
discussion on his views on miracles, is his distinction between two grounds of
probability: an evaluation of the acceptability of the proposition itself, and
an evaluation of the reliability of the instance, which communicates it to
us.�
1.2.
John Locke: A Discourse of Miracles
Starting with a definition of miracle,
Locke sees it as a sensible operation, which being above the comprehension of the
spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the established course of nature, is
taken by him to be divine. The one who is present at the fact is a spectator
and the one believes the history of the fact, puts himself in the place of the
spectator.
Locke makes two exceptions to the above
definitions: what seems to be a miracle for one depending of course on the
opinion of the spectator, may not be so for another. It is common opinion, says
Locke that a miracle should be that which surpasses the forces of nature in the
established steady laws of causes and effects. Nothing therefore can be judged
to be a miracle, which does not exceed those laws. Locke recognises that there
are different ways in which we perceive �the given�. This accounts for the
different interpretations we give to the perceived reality. Relating this to
the idea of miracles, every one judges a given phenomenon to be what he thinks
by his acquaintance with nature and the notions of its force. By this fact it
is unavoidable says Locke that what becomes a miracle for one person, is not so
for another.
A possible objection to the above
definition of a miracle is that the notion in its enlarged form,
sometimes takes in operations that have nothing extraordinary or supernatural
in them and thereby invalidate the use of miracles for the attesting of divine
revelation. To know that a testimony is from God, it is necessary to know that
the messenger that delivers it is sent from God, and that cannot be known but
by some credentials given him by God himself. Locke argues that to validate the
use of miracles for attesting divine revelation, the testimonies of both must
be rightly considered.
1.2.1. The Credibility and Infallibility of Miracles
as Directing us in the Search for Divine Revelation
Locke holds that divine revelation
receives testimony from no other miracles except those wrought to witness the
mission from God who delivers the revelation. He recognises the fact that a lot
of miracles are done in the world, which has nothing to do with revelation.
Cases wherein there has been, or can be need for miracles are perhaps fewer
than imagined. In the world of the heathen where an infinite and uncertain
jumble of deities, fables, and different shades of worship exist. There is no
room for the divine attestation of any one against the rest. The owners of many
gods were at liberty at their worship and they do not claim any superiority of
any of their deities over the rest or pretending their deity to be the only
true god. No one of these deities claim the use of miracles to establish its
one worship to the exclusion of others or to abolish the rest as profane. Thus,
Locke writes that he knows not of any miracles recorded in the Greek and Roman
writers, as done to perform any one�s mission and doctrine.
They do not even need miracles to affirm any articles of faith, since no one of
them had any such motive to propose that to their votaries. Locke may be right
in his context depending on what was operational in his time. However, this
understanding is not true in the heathen Igbo context of Nigeria. Even among the heathen, there is the
competition for miracles and the use of miracles to prove the authenticity of a
particular cult. These may not be real miracles in following the critique of
Locke, but for the owners of such cults who compete for adherents, and base on
which followers come, they are real. The testimonies of the witnesses are
enough authenticity for the truth of their teaching. The adherents, who are
already blindfolded in their quest for miracles fail to subject what is given
as miracle to any critical analysis even when there is room for such.
Fundamentally among the heathen in Igboland is the fact that cults and
attachment to them serve as means of livelihood even when such understanding is
hidden from the outside world. The quest for miracles is therefore a major
preoccupation of the owners of heathen cults through which more and more people
will come to believe in the supremacy of such a given cult over the rest. To a
very large extent the search for miracles is not in any way connected to a more
sincere and devoted praise of God but more on the psychological, physical,
emotional, spiritual, economic, social and political well being of the
adherents. The proof of the authenticity of miracles is not of any importance
to the ordinary Igbo person than his well being.
In Christendom, at least from the point
of view of the Igbo people, miracles take a different understanding, though not
exactly as Locke had proposed above. I believe that what the educated mind
could classify as �non-miracle� may be a �miracle� for the less educated. The
mental capacity to judge rightly is to a very large extent determined by the
level of awareness of the individual and his knowledge of the operational
cosmic and metaphysical sciences.
Locke�s further claim seems to support
my assertion above. He quotes St. Paul in 1Cor, 1: 22, where the Jews require miracles and
the Greeks look for something else. The Greeks knew no need or use of miracles
to recommend any religion to them. The Gentile world received and stuck to a
religion, which, not been derived from reason had no sure foundation in
revelation. They knew not its origin, nor the authors of it, nor seemed
concerned to know from where it came or whose authority delivered it and so had
no intention or use of miracles for its confirmation. For though there were
here and there some pretences to revelation, yet, there were not so much as
pretences to miracles that attested it.
Locke holds that we have in history three
people who have come in the name of the one only true God, professing to bring
a law from him. These are Moses, Jesus and Mahomet. He
believes as obscure and manifestly fabulous the Persians attestation of
Zoroaster, the Indians Brama and other wild stories of religions farther east.
Of the above mentioned three people, Locke holds that Mahomet, because he has
no miracles to produce, vouched the authenticity of his mission without them. I
would add immediately that the adherents of Mahomet did not believe less in
their doctrines of faith due to lack of miracles. If miracles are necessary for
Christians to believe in the authenticity of the Christian faith, probably and
even so, it does not hold for the followers of Mahomet. For Locke, therefore,
Moses and Christ were the only revelations that accompanied the attestation of
miracles and the testimony of each one confirmed the other. The business of
miracles as it stands in matter of fact says Locke, has no manner of difficulty
in it. The most scrupulous and sceptical cannot from the miracles raise the
least doubt against the divine revelation of the Gospels. Locke however
recognises the freedom of scholars and disputants to raise questions were there
are none, and enter into debates where there is need for none. But Locke also
believes that, he who comes with a message from God to be delivered to the
world cannot be refused belief if he vouches his mission by miracle, because
his credentials have a right to it.
For every rational thinking man must conclude like Nicodemus when he said, �we
know that thou art a teacher from God, for no man can do these signs which thou
doest, except God be with him.�
Jesus Christ for instance, With regard
to the calming of the tempest at sea by Jesus, Locke argues that one could see
this as a miracle and profess it as such. Others may think this might be the
effect of a chance or skill in the weather and therefore no miracle. But to see
Jesus walk on the sea is more convincing to most people even though, some could
attribute it to the work of a spirit. One could become a believer after seeing
Jesus cure a paralytic just by the mere words of the mouth, or his giving sight
to the man born blind, or in raising the dead, and so receives his doctrine as
revelation coming from God. However one plain truth is that once the miracle
has been accepted as true, the doctrine cannot be rejected. It comes with the
assurance of a divine attestation to him that allows the miracle, and he cannot
question its truth.
1.2.2.
Sufficient Inducement of taking any Extraordinary Operation to be a Miracle
Locke went further to consider the question of the
sufficient inducement of taking any extraordinary operation to be a miracle
wrought by God himself for the attestation of a revelation from him. The answer
for Locke was simple. It carries with it the marks of a greater power than
appears in opposition to it. He gives his reasons for this answer.
First it removes the main difficulty
where it presses hardest, and clears the matter from doubt, when extraordinary
and supernatural operations are brought to support opposite missions. Locke
gives his reasons that God�s power is paramount to all and no opposition can be
made against him with an equal force to his. God�s honour and image can never
be supposed to suffer his messenger and �his truth� by the appearance of a
greater power on the other side of an impostor. In favour of a lie, where there
is an opposition and two pretending to be sent by God, the signs carry with
them the evident marks of a greater power and will always be a certain and
unquestionable evidence, that the truth and divine mission are on that side on
which they appear. Locke recognises that the discovery of how the truth and the
lying wonders can be produced is beyond the capacity of the ignorant and often
beyond the conception of the most knowing spectator, who is therefore forced to
allow them in his apprehension to be the force of natural causes and effects.
Yet he cannot but know that they are not seals sent by God to his truth for the
attesting of it. Locke believes that God can never be thought to suffer that a
lie, set up in opposition to a truth coming from him, should be backed with a
greater power than he will show for the confirmation and propagation of a
doctrine which he has revealed, to the end it might be believed.
The producing of serpents, blood and frogs by the Egyptian sorcerers and by
Moses could appear miraculous to the spectator but the question is, �which of
the pretenders then had the mission from God?� This could have been a very
difficult question to answer if the matter was not settled there and then.� The fact that Moses� serpent ate up those of
the sorcerers made it easy to confirm the authority of the miracle, attesting to
the revelation of God.
Likewise the number, variety and
greatness of the miracles wrought for the confirmation of the doctrine
delivered by Jesus Christ, carry with them such strong marks of an
extraordinary divine power, that the truth of his mission will stand firm and
unquestionable, till anyone rising up to him shall do greater miracles than he
and his apostles did. For anything less will not be of weight to turn the
scales in the opinion of any, whether of any inferior or more exalted
understanding. Locke holds that this is one of those palpable truths and
trials, of which all mankind are judges, and there needs no assistance of
learning, no deep thought, to come to a certainty of it. It is also necessary
to point out here that not everybody can be chanced to be presented with these
opposing scenes as to better decipher which is true or not. Some people remain
on the level of a face miracle (whether false or true) that a contrary is not
even thought or presented as a counter opposition. Locke believes that God has
taken care to seeing that no pretended revelation should stand in competition
with what is truly divine, and that all we need is to open our eyes to be sure
which came from him. In support of this claim, Locke enumerated some premises:
-That no mission can be looked upon to be divine,
that delivers any thing derogating from the honour of the one, only, true,
invisible God, or inconsistent with the natural religion and the rules of
morality. This is because God who discovered for men the unity and majesty of
his eternal Godhead, and the truths of natural religion and morality by the
light of reason, cannot be supposed to back the contrary by revelation. To do
this is to destroy the evidence and the use of reason, without which men may
not be able to distinguish the divine revelation from diabolic imposture.
-God cannot be expected to send anyone
into the world on purpose to inform men of things indifferent and of small
moment; or that, which are knowable by the use of natural faculties. For to do
this will be to lessen the dignity of his majesty in favour of our sloth, and
in prejudice to our reason.
-The revelation of some supernatural
truths relating to the glory of God and some great concern of men will
therefore be the only way the mission of anyone can be reconciled to the high
and awful thoughts men have about God (Deity). Supernatural operations
attesting such a revelation may with reason be taken to be miracles, as
carrying the marks of a superior and over-ruling power. God cannot suffer his
prerogative to be so usurped by any inferior being, as to permit any creature,
depending on him, to set his seals, the marks of his divine authority, to a
mission coming from him. For these supernatural signs being the only means God
is conceived to have to satisfy men, as rational creatures, of the certainty of
anything he would reveal, as coming from himself, can never consent that it
should be wrested out of his hands to serve the ends and establish the
authority of an inferior agent that rivals him.
Locke maintains that God�s power, being
known to have no equal, always will and always may be, safely depended on, to
show its superiority in vindicating his authority, and maintaining every truth
that he has revealed. So that marks of superiority accompanying it, has always
been and will always be, a visible and sure guide to divine revelation, by
which men may conduct themselves in their examining of revealed religions and
the satisfaction which they ought to be coming from God.
Christ used this against the Jews when he queried in John 15, 24 thus, �if I
had not performed such works among them as no one else has ever done, they
would be blameless; but as it is, in spite of what they have seen they hate
both me and my father�. Jesus by this saying declares that they could not see
the power and presence of God in those miracles he did, which were greater than
those, which any man can do. Locke ends his discourse of miracles by affirming
his knowledge of the abilities of good and bad angels and of the excellencies
existing beyond all our poor performances and narrow comprehensions. Important
too is his recognition that his discourse and theory fail us when we use and
apply them in particular cases.��
1.3. David Hume: Enquiries Concerning the Human
Understanding. Section X, Of Miracles (1758).
David Hume (1711-1776) is believed by
James Gilman to be the chief thinker to shape the modern discussion of
miracles.
This could be traceable to the fact that Hume�s definition of a miracle as �a
transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity� has
been assumed by many.
Writing on David Hume and the Probability of Miracles, George Mavrodes
said, �section X of David Hume�s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
is probably the most celebrated and most influential discussion of miracles in
western philosophical literature.
It is so for the reason that the essay is unusually provocative and suggestive
as much for what it does not say as for what it does say. In particular, it is
noteworthy that the essay itself is explicitly restricted to the way in which
testimony bears on the credibility of miracles. The maxim in which Hume claims
to have established is that �no human testimony can have such force as to prove
a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion.�
In the second part of Hume�s essay, belief in miracle is criticised a
posteriori. This is evident in Hume�s argument that the testimony upon
which, a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to entire proof, and that the
falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: but it is easy to show
that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and there never
was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence.� In other words, Hume argues that it is in
principle invalid to accept testimonies of miracles for truth. He provides four
reasons why reports for historical miracles, don�t prove the truth of religion.
He knew the arguments from Deist literature. These reasons are:
�
First, there is not to be found, in all history any
attestation by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense,
education and learning, as to secure us against all decision in themselves. In
other words, the available testimonies of the miracles are usually inaccurate
�
Secondly, we may observe in human nature a principle,
which, if strictly examined will be found to diminish extremely the assurance,
which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. People
believe in miracles out of passion for what is strange and miraculous.
�
Thirdly, miracles form a strong presumption against all
supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound
among ignorant and barbarous nations. Thus miracles are typical for primitive
cultures and not for civilised ones.
�
�Lastly, miracles
diminish the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for them, even
those which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an
infinite number of witnesses. Thus each religion appeals to miracles to support
truths, which are mutually exclusive.
Hume says nothing at all about whether
people who were themselves witnesses of a miracle might thereby have a
satisfactory ground for believing in that miracle and perhaps even for making it
the foundation of their religion. But if there were no witnesses of miracles,
or at least no people who claimed to be witnesses, there would presumably be no
miracle testimonies. We should not, therefore, hastily assume that testimonial
evidence is the whole evidential story about miracles.
Hume proposes a strategy for a rational
thinker to use in considering miracle testimonies. He treats the credibility of
miracles at least insofar as that credibility involves some important appeal to
testimony- as depending upon a comparison of probabilities. He wants to compare
the probabilities of miracles with the probability of error and deception in
human testimony. The desired outcome for Hume is that the probability of the
miracle is always lower than the probability that the testimony is mistaken or
lying.
That is why the wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. He reaches the
conclusion that the course of wisdom would be that of rejecting the testimony
rather that accepting the miracle. And in order for this line of argument to be
successful, it is necessary that the probability assigned to the miraculous
should always be very low. Humean strategy following the logic of the argument
advocates for two probabilities, one about miracles and the other about
testimony. A typical hypothetical case from Hume goes this way:
When any one tells me, that he saw
a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider within myself, whether it
be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that
the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one
miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover,
I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the
falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he
relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or
opinion.
I think Hume believes that there is
nothing miraculous about the falsehood of human testimony. He does not however
think that a mistaken or lying testimony is a transgression of a law of nature.
On the other hand, it seems probable that Hume really thinks that a dead man
restored to life would be a miracle in his defined sense, a transgression of
the law of nature. In fact, it seems probable that many Christians believe that
the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the miracle par excellence in the
Christian faith. He rejects the claim of theologians who believe they are able
to demonstrate the validity of their religion on the basis of miracles and
prophecies.
1.4.
Locke and Hume compared
In the first place, Hume takes for
granted the two criteria developed by Locke to access the probability of an
historical fact. On a similarity grounds between the two, Locke advocates that
the grounds for the truth of anything is the conformity of it with our own
knowledge, observation, and experience, and also the testimony of others,
vouching their observation and experience; Hume also upholds the veracity of
our testimony and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of
witnesses.� For Hume, miracles are above
the laws of nature, therefore the probabilities about miracles and testimonies
are important. A critical interpretation of Hume would claim that the testimony
about resurrection, and other apparently miraculous happenings, is not uniform.
Hume and others like him may profess not to have observed any such things. With
regard to the resurrection of Christ, there have apparently been some people
who claimed to have seen Jesus a week after his execution, alive and well
talking with them, eating with them and so on. However, in the testimony of
others, Locke considers the number, the integrity, the skill of the witnesses,
the design of the author; in case of a testimony from a book, the consistency
of the parts, and circumstances of relation, and finally the contrary
testimonies. Hume considers other causes like the opposition of a contrary
testimony, the character or number of witnesses, the manner of the delivery of
the testimony or from the union of these circumstances. Parallel to Locke, Hume
seems to believe the miracles of Christianity on the grounds of faith. Though
ironical, Hume�s miracle of faith expresses his deep personal conviction.
Locke�s account of miracles is on the
one hand conservative and rationalistic. He reduces the phenomenon of miracles
to the attestation of Jesus� mission. On the other hand, he wants to uphold the
na�ve belief that the undoubted presence of miracles has for the believer the
conclusion that the message of the author of divine revelation is highly
probable. Hume�s attraction to radical empiricism leads him to ignore some
other essential features of a viable intellectual life, features which have
more of an a priori flavour about
them.�
Situating
Locke and Hume�s concepts of miracle in the context of Christianity in Igboland
of Nigeria.
As a young church in Igboland of
Nigeria, a discourse of miracles especially as a proof of Christianity is more
appreciated in its practical and experiential sense than mathematical
certainty. This is not to underscore the biblical testimonies of the proof of
miracles as authentic proof of Christianity. There is for instance less appeal
to rational thinking than accepting the fact of a miracle in the Igbo Christian
context. The testimonies required for the proof of miracles are those of the
witnesses, and in our very context, the interpreters of Christianity. The
problem here is a one sided evaluation in the sense that what becomes true and
miraculous for these interpreters holds true and miraculous for the generality
of the Christians. Even for a stronger faith in Christianity, miracles are
needed and sought for by a large number of Christians. The result of this
search is not to truly believe in the person of Jesus but to be more convinced
that the promises that are embedded in the scriptures for Christians are
fulfilled. Jesus has promised, for instance, in the gospels that believers in
him will pick up serpents and be unharmed. They will drink poison without
getting hurt and so on.� Most Christians
in Igboland would like these and similar miracles to be fulfilled in their
lives as proof of continuous trust in the faithful God of Christianity.
One basic fact that is true for the Igbo
church is that the testimonies of miracles form the foundation of
Christianity.� Unlike Hume, the Igbo
Christian finds it unnecessary to compare the probabilities of miracles with
the probability of error and deception in human testimony. The miracles
themselves suffice. Hume reaches the conclusion that the course of wisdom would
be that of rejecting the testimony rather that accepting the miracle. But in
the Igbo Church, the reserve is mostly the case. The reason can be deduced from
mere transient phenomena. What may appear normal for the western mind may not
be so for an African given the different cultural background and exposure of
both persons. There is, therefore, a very high level of intellectual formation
of the western mind that he calls into consideration a number of factors before
taking anything to be miraculous or not. On the contrary, the simple
testimonies of witnesses, is enough reason and a convincing one too, to
believing in the authenticity of what is revealed in the African context. In
other words, the authority of the witnesses to a very large extent proves the
truthfulness of what they testify to. In all we can say that the paradigm of
Locke fits more to the sensitivity of the Igbo church than that of Hume, though
each has its own credits and pitfalls.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DE MEY, P., Unpublished Lecture Notes on
Theology and Tradition, Leuven, 2001.
GILMAN, J. E., Reconceiving Miracles
in Religious Studies, Vol. 25, (1989), pp. 477-487.
HUME, D., Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, (reprinted) New York, 1988.
LOCKE, J., An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, 1690.
The Complete Works of John Locke, Discourse
on Miracles, Vol. ix, (1823), pp. 256-265.